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Abstract 
As globalization eviscerates national borders, governments in both developed and developing countries are 
discovering that their tax base is eroding, especially their ability to tax the proceeds and profits from corporate 
investment and finance Domestic revenue mobilization is key to sustainable development finance – only self-
sufficiency will allow the development of fully-functioning states with flourishing systems of political 
representation and economies reflecting societies’ expressed preferences in regard to, for example, inequality. 
The significant of this paper therefore is that it will enable the revenue authority take necessary steps to prevent 
tax avoidance and tax evasion so as to increase the level of domestic revenue for development. It concluded that 
claims of corporate social responsibility are undermined when low corporate tax payments are exposed and a 
process of tax competition at the global level undermines the social contract previously set within the national 
arena, as states compete to offer tax exemption to capital. The paper suggested that with effective tax 
administration, adequate taxation of transnational corporations, tax compliance as part of corporate 
accountability, international tax cooperation, fight against bribery and corruption, arm length international 
trade negotiations and reduction in military expenditure, the problems are more likely to be solved.  
_________________________________________________________________________________________ 
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INTRODUCTION 
Historically, tax policies have been developed 
primarily to address domestic economic and social 
concerns. The forms and levels of taxation were 
established on the basis of the desired level of 
publicly provided goods and transfers, allocating, 
stabilizing and redistributive aims thought 
appropriate for a country. Whilst domestic tax 
systems of essentially closed economies also had an 
international dimension in that they potentially 
affected the amount of tax imposed on foreign source 
income of domestic residents and typically included 
in the tax base the domestic income of non-residents, 
the interaction of domestic tax systems was relatively 
unimportant, given the limited mobility of capital. 
The decision to have a high rate of tax and a high 
level of government spending or low taxes and 
limited public outlays, the mix of direct and indirect 
taxes, and the use of tax incentives, were all matters 
which were decided primarily on the basis of 
domestic concerns and had principally domestic 
effects. While there were some international spillover 
effects on other economies, those effects were 
generally limited. 
 
The accelerating process of globalization of trade and 
investment has fundamentally changed the 
relationship among domestic tax systems, the 
removal of non-tax barriers to international 
commerce and investment and the resulting 
integration of national economies have greatly 
increased the potential impact that domestic tax 
policies can have on other economies. Globalization 
has been one of the driving forces behind tax reforms, 
which have focused on base broadening and rate 
reductions, thereby minimizing tax induced 
distortions. It has encouraged countries to assess 
continually their tax systems and public expenditures 
with a view to making adjustments where appropriate 
to improve the “fiscal climate” for investment, 
increased mobility of capital, promotion of 
development, financial markets, and encouraged 
countries to reduce tax barriers to capital flows and 
modernize their tax systems to reflect these 
developments. This process has improved welfare 
and living standards around the world by creating a 
more efficient allocation and utilization of resources. 
Globalization has had a positive and negative effect 
on the development of tax systems such as capital 
flow across national boundaries and exploitation of 
countries in the area of tax avoidance. The study 
therefore looks at globalization and the precarious 
state of public finance in Nigeria.  
 
Sources of Revenues in Developing Countries  
Government capacity to tax depends on its ability to 
maintain its tax jurisdiction, although, factor mobility 
such as capital and labor erode this. As a result 
globalization has forced a fourth criterion on 
government:  taxing the factor of production, land 
that is less mobile. The United Nations Millennium 
Project (2005) in its report points out that in order to 
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realize the MDGs, Official Development Assistance 
(ODA) would need to increase to $195 billion by 
2015. According to the report, the transfer of 
resources from industrialized countries only 
constitutes a fraction of the aggregate income of the 
developing and transitional countries. In 2004, the net 
ODA share of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 
all developing countries stood at just 0.5% (UNDP, 
2006). In countries like China, Argentina and India 
the share lies at 0.1%, in Malaysia at 0.2%. 
Nevertheless, there are numerous exceptions: next to 
the small island developing states, crisis-ridden 
countries in Africa are particularly reliant on 
development aid. In the majority of developing and 
transitional countries, the share of public revenue to 
GDP lies well below the average of that of the 
industrialized countries. According to World Bank 
(2006) estimates, the share of central government 
revenues to GDP in low-income countries was only 
13% in 2004. In contrast, in high-income countries it 
was 26.0% and in the European Economic and 
Monetary Union it was 35.7% (World Bank, 2006). 
The financial capabilities of governments in many 
developing countries are thus not only severely 
limited in absolute numbers, but also in relation to the 
GDP – and so are their abilities of providing 
reasonable quality public goods and services, 
particularly in education and health care. 
 
Globalization and Public Finance 
Taxes only constitute a fraction of national budgets in 
developing countries. Significant and additional 
sources of revenue are import and export duties, 
revenues from public enterprises, royalties for the 
extraction of natural resources (particularly crude 
oil), foreign aid, loans and government bonds. In 
developing countries, only 16% of state revenues 
come from taxing income, business profits and 
capital gains, while 32% is collected through taxes on 
goods and services, particularly through the value-
added tax (World Bank, 2005). In the global 
competition for foreign investment, many 
governments attempt to attract transnational 
corporations through low taxes, subsidies and other 
incentives. In the past few years, a virtual ‘tax race to 
the bottom’ has emerged on a global scale. To attract 
foreign investment capital, governments have 
established Export Processing Zones (EPZs) 
worldwide. The International Labour Organization 
(ILO) estimates their numbers at over 3000 (ILO, 
2003). Transnational corporations producing for 
export are granted numerous concessions in these 
zones, which include the unrestricted transfer of 
capital (including the repatriation of profits to 
countries of origin), reduced labour rights, low 
environmental and social standards as well as diverse 
tax incentives. Often governments guarantee 
investors full tax exemptions (‘tax holidays’) for a 
minimum of five to ten years. Thereafter, 
corporations in EPZs are charged substantially lower 
taxes than local businesses that produce for domestic 
consumption. This is the case for EPZs in Ghana, 
where foreign companies do not have to pay more 
than 8% tax on profits after the 10-year period has 
expired. Kenya, too, grants ‘tax holidays’ for a time 
span of ten years, after which it imposes a flat tax of 
25 percent (KPMG, 2006). 
 
The spectrum of investment incentives used by 
governments to win the favour of foreign investors is 
summarized by an advertisement for Export 
Processing Zones in Nigeria: “The regulatory regime 
for EPZs in Nigeria is liberal and provides a good 
environment for profitable operations. The incentives 
available to operators in Nigeria’s EPZs compare 
favourably with the most attractive elsewhere in the 
world and are the best in the region. They include one 
hundred per cent foreign ownership of investments, 
“one stop” approvals, no import or export licenses, 
duty free import of raw materials, unrestricted 
remittance of capital profits and dividends, tax 
holidays and no strikes.” (Martens, 2007) All these 
incentives run at the expense of state budgets, which 
consequently have to make up for considerable losses 
in income. This is despite the fact that for many 
corporations, financial incentives do not constitute 
the only criteria for investment decisions. Other 
important factors are good infrastructure, the 
availability of a qualified work force, the extent of 
state regulation, low transport costs and, where 
production is not for export, domestic market 
opportunities. The consulting firm McKinsey, 
surveying 30 corporations that had moved their 
production to India, found that financial incentives 
were at the bottom of the list of factors that 
influenced investment decisions (Farrell et al, 2004). 
Over the course of the globalization of the production 
chain, transfer pricing has become one of the most 
important instruments for tax avoidance. The 
significance of transfer pricing is evident by the fact 
that, more than 50% of worldwide trade in goods and 
services occurs within transnational corporations 
(WTO, 2004). 
 
Capital flight to tax havens leads to substantial 
revenue losses in developing countries. The term 
‘capital flight’ is not clearly defined. Capital flight 
refers to the illegal, undocumented transfer of capital 
out of a country by corporations and private 
individuals, and is primarily done to evade 
government regulation and tax. Capital flight is the 
transfer of assets abroad in order to reduce loss of 
principal, loss of return, or loss of control over one’s 
financial wealth due to government-sanctioned. The 
funds embezzled and exported by corrupt heads of 
state alone amounted to many billions of dollars in 
the past few decades (see the list compiled by 
Transparency International on some of the worst 
cases of embezzled public funds in Table 1).  The 
European Commission estimates that in Africa, the 
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illegal transfer of money amounts to more than half 
of the foreign debt of that continent (CEC, 2003). 
This adds up to nearly USD 200 billion (World Bank, 
2006).  
 
Table 1:  The worst cases of embezzled funds                                                                                                                      
Source: Transparency International, 2004 
  
State of Public Finance in Nigeria 
The federal government is responsible for collecting 
taxes on income, profits, and property, as well as 
import and export taxes and excise duties. It also runs 
the national transportation system. The petroleum 
sector provides over 83% of budgetary revenues. A 
large share of these revenues is redistributed to state 
governments. The budget is consistently in deficit. 
Public investment flourished during the oil boom 
years of the 1970s. When the oil market prices 
collapsed in the 1980s however, the Nigerian 
government maintained its high level of spending, 
thus acquiring substantial foreign debt. Although 
privatization efforts began in 1986, increased 
government spending outside the official budget 
since 1990 has damaged public finance reform. Taxes 
only constitute a fraction of national budgets in 
Nigeria. Significant and additional sources of revenue 
are import and export duties, revenues from public 
enterprises, royalties for the extraction of natural 
resources (particularly crude oil), foreign aid, loans 
and government bonds. In Nigeria, only 16 % of state 
revenues come from taxing income, business profits 
and capital gains, while 32 % is collected through 
taxes on goods and services, particularly through the 
value-added tax (World Bank, 2005).  
 
In terms of income and wealth distribution, the 
prominence of indirect taxes in Nigeria as in many 
developing countries is highly problematic. This is 
because the value-added tax places a burden 
primarily on the poor and low-income families, who 
must spend most of their money on consumption. In 
contrast, for wealthier groups these taxes hardly carry 
any weight in relation to their incomes. To the benefit 
of affluent elites, governments often exempt entire 
sections of the economy from effective taxation, and 
in doing so forego revenues that amount to billions of 
naira. This is the case for profits from transnational 
corporations in export processing zones and taxation 
on property. According to UNDP (1999), property 
tax on large landowners could lead to significant 
additional revenues for governments in this sector 
(UNDP, 1999). In Nigeria, the mobilization of public 
revenues is made more difficult by the growing 
informal or ‘shadow’ economy. The shadow 
economy includes all economic activities that are not 
within the control of the state, and therefore also 
outside its tax jurisdiction. The following three types 
of activities are elements of the shadow economy: 
Informal economic activities in household 
productions and small enterprises, mostly to meet 
subsistence needs; Criminal activities that are tied to 
financial transactions, for example drug trafficking, 
corruption or child prostitution and Illicit work and 
similar activities which are generally legal, but 
deliberately concealed from public authorities in 
order to avoid the payment of taxes and avoid having 
to meet certain legal standards such as minimum 
wages. Schneider, in a comprehensive study on the 
shadow economy in 145 countries, comes to the 
conclusion that in 2003 the informal sector made up 
41.2 % of GDP in Africa, 41.5 % in Latin America, 
and 26.3 % in Asia (Schneider, 2002).  
 
Cobham (2005) estimates that tax revenues in 
developing countries would yield an additional USD 
252 billion per year if the shadow economy were to 
be fully integrated into the formal economy.  
 
Table 2: The magnitude of the shadow economy in 
selected countries 
Country Shadow economy in  
% of GDP 1999/2000                                                   
Shadow economy in % 
of GDP 2002/2003                            
Nigeria     57.9     59.4 
Zambia     48.9     50.8 
Zimbabwe     59.4     63.2 
Tanzania     58.3     60.2 
Argentina     25.4     28.9 
Brazil     39.8     42.3 
Mexico     30.1     33.2 
China     13.1     15.6 
India     23.1     25.6 
Germany     16.0     16.8 
Great Britain     12.7     12.2  
Japan     11.2     10.8 
USA      8.7      8.4 
 Source: Schneider 2004 
  
In addition to the problems of developing a 
comprehensive and effective tax system in Nigeria, 
government is unable to make full use of the income 
potential that already exists. In the global competition 
for foreign investment, the Nigerian government 
attempt to attract transnational corporations through 
the establishment of Export Processing Zones, where 
         Head of State      Embezzled 
Funds   (USD) 
1  Mohamed Suharto, President of 
Indonesia (1967-1998) 
           15-35 billion 
2  Ferdinand Marcos, President of 
Philippines (1965-1986) 
             5-10 billion 
3  Mobutu Sese Seko, President of 
Zaire (1965-1997) 
                   5 billion 
4  Sani Abacha, President of Nigeria 
(1993-1998) 
                2-5 billion 
5  Slobodan Milosevic, President of 
Serbia/Yugoslavia (1989-2000) 
                   1 billion 
6 Jean Claude Duvalier, President of 
Haiti (1971-1986) 
     300-800 million 
7 Alberto Fujimori, President of Peru 
(1990-2000) 
             600 million 
8 Pavio Lazarenko, Prime Minister of 
Ukraine (1996-1997) 
     114-200 million 
9 Arnoldo Aleman, President of 
Nicaragua (1997-2002)  
             100 million 
10 Joseph Estrada, President of 
Philippines (1998-2001) 
         78-80 million 
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Transnational corporations producing for export are 
granted numerous concessions, which include the 
unrestricted transfer of capital (including the 
repatriation of profits to countries of origin), reduced 
labour rights, low environmental and social standards 
as well as diverse tax incentives. The incentives 
available to operators in Nigeria’s EPZs compare 
favourably with the most attractive elsewhere in the 
world and are the best in the region. They include one 
hundred per cent foreign ownership of investments, 
“one stop” approvals, no import or export licenses, 
duty free import of raw materials, unrestricted 
remittance of capital profits and dividends, tax 
holidays and no strikes” (Martens, 2007). All these 
incentives run at the expense of state budgets, which 
consequently have to make up for considerable losses 
in income. This is despite the fact that for many 
corporations, financial incentives do not constitute 
the only criteria for investment decisions. Other 
important factors are good infrastructure, the 
availability of a qualified work force, the extent of 
state regulation, low transport costs and, where 




What Are Public Revenues Used For?  
How governments spend their money is central to the 
social and economic development of a society. The 
political priorities of governments are reflected more 
clearly in public budgets than in government 
declarations and action programmes. However, the 
responsibility for failed budget policies does not only 
lay with government, often, conditional ties imposed 
by the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank has substantially constrained the decision-
making power of government over their national 
budget and the use of public revenues.  
 
Health and Education Expenditures 
Public investments in education and health are 
essential for alleviating poverty and realizing the 
MDGs. In Nigeria, spending on these sectors in both 
absolute and relative terms is entirely insufficient. 
Whereas the governments of rich countries allocate, 
on average, 13 to 23 percent of state revenues to 
public health provisions, the share in many 
developing countries remains stagnant at fewer than 
10% (see Table 3). In the last few years, the Nigerian 
governments have shifted the burden of healthcare 
provision onto the shoulders of private households 
(WHO, 2006).  
Table 3: Public and private expenditures on health 
Country  Public expenditure in % of total 
expenditure on health 
 Private expenditure in % of total 
expenditure on health 
General government expenditures on health in % 
of total government expenditure  
    1999                    2003         1999                    2003                    1999                          2003 
Angola     45.3                    84.2          54.7                     15.8                          2.4                              5.3 
Argentina    56.5                     48.6     43.5                     51.4                15.0                           14.7 
Botswana    54.3                     58.2     45.7                     41.8                6.7                             7.5   
Burkina Faso    44.0                     46.8        56.0                     53.2              10.0                           12.7   
Burundi    19.9                     23.3     80.1                     76..7                2.8                             2.0 
Congo    63.8                     64.2     36.2                     35.8                4.9                             4.3 
Egypt    33.9                     42.6     66.1                     57.4                5.6                             8.2 
Gabon    68.4                     66.6    31.6                      33.4              10.9                           12.8    
India    24.6                     24.8    75.4                      75.2                4.5                             3.9 
Mozambique    63.0                     61.7    37.0                      38.3              12.1                           10.9 
Nigeria    29.1                     25.5    70.9                      74.5                5.4                             3.2 
Eritrea    70.3                     45.5    29.7                      54.5                2.9                             4.0               
Pakistan    32.6                     27.7             67.4                      72.3                           4.0                             2.6 
Uruguay    34.8                     27.2                   65.2                      72.8                   10.6                             6.3         
Source: WHO, 2006 
 
Federal Government expenditures on education are 
below 10 percent of its overall expenditures. Table 4 
presents these shares, and separately for recurrent and  
 
 
capital expenditures, based on actual expenditures 
between 1997 and 2002. Overall, the shares have 
varied between 9.9 and 7.6 percent and the trend has 
been largely downward.   
 
Table 4: Federal Government Expenditure on Education as share of Federal Expenditure, 1997- 2002 (%) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Recurrent 12.3 12.0 11.7 9.4 9.5 9.1 
Capital 6.1 7.5 5.0 8.5 6.0 6.0 
Total 9.9 9.6 9.0 9.0 7.6 8.0 
Source: Federal Government of Nigeria Annual Budget (various years). Reported in Herbert (2002)  
 
Military expenditures at the expense of the poor 
Military expenditure and debt servicing account for a 
high proportion of total expenditure in many 
developing countries, including Nigeria and the two 
items are closely connected. Real military 
expenditures probably lay far beyond the official 
figures, as for many countries, particularly in Africa; 
there is no dependable data available. Some 
components of military expenditures and some 
sources of income – for example reimbursements for 
troop contributions to UN peacekeeping operations – 
do not appear in the official budget figures of 
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countries like Mali, Ethiopia, Ghana and Nigeria 
(Mitoogun, 2003). In 2004, developing countries 
spent an average of 15.6% of their budgets on the 
military, while wealthy countries spent an average of 
10.5% (SIPRI, 2005).  
 
Steps Toward Achieving Global Tax Justice 
Every year, developing countries including Nigeria 
lose billions of dollars through tax evasion, tax 
avoidance and inefficient fiscal authorities. A large 
portion of the already scarce revenues goes toward 
military expenditures, harmful subsidies and debt 
repayment, none of which contribute toward 
alleviating poverty and promoting sustainable 
development. The responsibility for reform must be 
for all nations world-wide. It is the industrialized 
countries, particularly the EU, the USA and the 
institutions that they dominate (the IMF, the World 
Bank and the WTO) who are responsible for the 
erosion of revenue bases due to forced tariff 
reductions and the resistance to long overdue debt 
cancellations. They must reform their economic and 
trade policies accordingly. A basic requirement for 
strengthening public revenues is a broad based tax 
system. Taxation should be based on ability to pay, 
and rich individuals and large landowners should be 
taxed accordingly. Capital and resource consumption 
should be taxed instead of labour. A flat and 
undifferentiated value-added tax is regressive, 
burdens the poor, and cannot contribute to forming a 
just tax system. Development cooperation should 
actively support these reforms through capacity 
building and technical assistance.  
 
Strengthen Tax Authorities and Financial 
Administrations 
A tax system is only as effective as the administrative 
machinery that is responsible for implementing and 
collecting the taxes. In many countries, such a tax 
administration still needs to be developed, or at least 
strengthened. This involves a legal framework as well 
as necessary staff and technical infrastructure. Only 
in this way can shadow economies be reduced, tax 
avoidance overcome and tax evasion prevented. 
Development cooperation can provide the crucial 
technical and financial support for this. 
 
Tax Compliance As: Part of Corporate 
Accountability 
The debate on corporate social responsibility and 
accountability has so far concentrated on basic 
environmental and social standards, human rights and 
preventing corruption. It is important that enterprises 
contribute to the public finances of host countries by 
making timely payment of their tax liabilities. In 
particular, enterprises should comply with the tax 
laws and regulations in all countries in which they 
operate and should exert every effort to act in 
accordance with both the letter and spirit of tax laws 
and regulations. This would include such measures as 
providing to the relevant authorities the information 
necessary for the correct determination of taxes to be 
assessed in connection with their operations and 
conforming transfer pricing practices to the arm’s 
length principle. 
 
Fight Bribery and Corruption 
In order to avoid the embezzlement of public funds 
and reduce revenue losses due to fraud, corruption 
and bribery, more decisive rules and procedures are 
necessary both in affected countries and at the 
international level. The United Nations Convention 
against Corruption, which came into force on 14 
December 2005, plays an important role here. This 
comprehensive international set of rules has been 
signed by 140 countries and ratified by 78 (as at 
November 2006). The convention contains 
regulations for criminal proceedings, preventing 
corruption, improving international cooperation and 
the repatriation of embezzled funds from abroad.  
 
Stop the Pressure to Liberalize Trade in 
International Trade Negotiations 
As long as the budgets in many countries, particularly 
in Nigeria, depend on customs revenues, forced trade 
liberalization leads to substantial losses in income. 
Governments of affected countries cannot adequately 
compensate for these cuts in the short term. The EU 
and the USA should therefore stop pressuring 
developing countries to reduce their tariffs in 
negotiations at the World Trade Organization, as well 
as in negotiations for inter-regional trade agreements, 
instead, affected countries (in accordance with the 
principle of ‘Special and Differential Treatment’) 
should be able to determine the pace and the extent of 
further liberalization steps on their own.  
 
Reduce Military Expenditures and Strengthen 
Peace Building 
By reducing military budgets, large sums of money 
could be freed up for education and health. A 
precondition for this, however, is strengthened 
support of conflict prevention, peacekeeping and 
peace-building. The new UN Peace-building 
Commission can play an important role in this if it is 
equipped with the necessary financial resources. At 
the same time, the largest arms-producing countries 
(in particular the five permanent members of the 
Security Council) have a responsibility to improve 
the control and regulation of their arms exports and to 
support a Global Arms Trade Treaty.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Large corporations and wealthy individuals are 
increasingly avoiding their obligation to contribute to 
society through taxation. With the aid of 
governments, they are shifting the tax burden further 
onto ordinary citizens and smaller businesses. 
Governments claim that revenues are too low to 
achieve social justice through decent public goods 
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and services; privatization and cuts in social 
expenditure are presented as the only solutions. 
Instead, we argue for tax justice: to restore the ability 
to tax the wealthy beneficiaries of globalization. Tax 
avoidance now occurs on a massive global scale. 
Assets held offshore, beyond the reach of effective 
taxation, are already estimated to equal one-third of 
total global assets. Around half of all world trade 
appears to pass through tax haven jurisdictions, as 
corporations shift profits to where they can avoid tax. 
Networks of banks, lawyers and accountants create 
complex and secret financial structures, reducing 
transparency and enabling tax evasion. Claims of 
corporate social responsibility are undermined when 
low corporate tax payments are exposed. Such 
behaviour is economically inefficient, socially 
destructive, and profoundly unethical. These trends 
threaten democracy and development. A process of 
tax competition at the global level undermines the 
social contract previously set within the national 
arena, as states compete to offer tax exemptions to 
capital. Tax havens grow more numerous, the world’s 
richest financial centres get even richer, taxes paid by 
large corporations fall, and ordinary citizens bear the 
cost. We call upon all concerned to meet this 
challenge, by building global and national campaigns 
for tax justice.  
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